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 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms from 1950 in art.8 explicitly states the right to privacy of personal and family life of 
each person. The intervention of the state authorities in exercising that right shall not be 
admitted except in cases stipulated in the law and in those necessary for a democratic society 
in the interest of national and public security or of the economic prosperity of the country, to 
prevent riots or crimes, to protect health and morality or the rights and freedoms of the others. 
 The European Court of Human Rights /ECtHR/ has not had the opportunity to pass 
judgment on the balance between the mother and father’s interests when exercising the right 
to family life. From a legal point of view the question about the right to paternity has arisen in 
front of the ECtHR concerning abortion or the decision on an intentional ending of the 
pregnancy. What have been evincive are the arguments of the Court with respect to the case 
Boso v. Italy
1
. In this case the wife of the plaintiff decided to end the pregnancy in spite of her 
husband’s objection and disagreement. The complainant has pointed out that there had been a 
violation of his rights to family life as a potential parent /art.8/, as there had been a violation 
of the right to the unborn child’s life /art.2/. The complainant had been dissatisfied with the 
fact that the right to take the decision to end the pregnancy had been given entirely to the 
mother, without taking into account the father’s objections. Moreover, according to the 
complainant, giving the opportunity to the wife to get an abortion has prevented his right to 
raise a family, respectively the right to paternity.   
 In its judgment on the 5
th
 Sept, 2005 the European Court of Human Rights pointed out 
that the right to private and family life, stipulated in art. 8 of the ECHR, could not be 
interpreted so expansively so as to include the husband’s right to be consulted with about the 
abortion, which his wife intended to have
2
. The court had accepted that each interpretation of 
the right to potential paternity under art.8 of the Convention, in the cases where the mother 
had intended to have an abortion shall also take into consideration her rights, as she has been 
the person most affected by the pregnancy and its continuation or ending.   
The court also pointed out that in this particular case the abortion was performed in 
conformity with the legislation of Italy and was aimed at protecting the mother’s health – i.e. 
the intervention when exercising the right to private and family life was justified, since it was 
necessary for the protection of the other person’s rights and freedoms. In this instance the 
court adopted that the hypothesis of art.8, par.2 of the ECHR was present, hence there was no 
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violation of art.8 of the ECHR and consequently of art.14 of the Convention too, and 
therefore disallowed the complaint.   
 Several years later the European Court of Human Rights had the opportunity to 
pronounce judgment again on the proportionality of the interests of the potential mother, 
father and unborn child. It considered the case Evans v. The United Kingdom
3
. The 
complainant Natallie Evans, together with her partner Mr Johnston, asked for sterility 
treatment. About three months later, after beginning the treatment the couple were informed 
that Ms Evans had small cancer formations in her ovaries which led to their surgical excision. 
Before the operation, the couple were suggested on an opportunity for some ova to be selected 
to be used for in-vitro fertilization. The procedure was concurred with by the couple, as they 
were notified that each other’s consent could be withdrawn at any time before implanting the 
embryo. Mr Johnston assured Ms Evans that he would like to be the father of their children, 
and he gave his consent that the ova be fertilized immediately with his spermatozoa. (It was 
clarified to Ms Evans that the clinic did not have the opportunity to freeze only ova, as this 
method had less chance of success). A month later six embryos were successfully made and 
frozen. Ms Evans had an operation to excise her ovaries and was advised to wait for two years 
before trying to implant some of the embryos into her uterus.     
 Meanwhile the relationship between the complainant and Mr Johnston broke down, 
and he notified the clinic in writing that he would like the created and frozen embryos to be 
destroyed. The managing board of the clinic themselves notified Ms Evans that they were 
obliged to satisfy Mr Johnston’s desire to destroy the embryos. Ms Evans approached the 
British High Court with the claim that Mr Johnston to gave his consent for the embryos to be 
preserved and used later. She also pointed out that the embryos were under the protection of 
art. 2 of ECHR, as well as her rights were being infringed under art. 8 and art. 14 of the 
Convention. The court passed a temporary judgement on preserving the embryo till the case 
was concluded, but it rejected Ms Evans’s claim. Her complaint referred to the Court of 
Appeal was also rejected, whereupon she appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. 
At first on 7
th
 March 2006, her complaint was rejected by the 7-member commission of the 
ECtHR with five votes to two, and after that the Grand Chamber passed judgement on the 
case. In its judgement on 10
th
 April, 2007 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg gave its own interpretation of art.2, art.8 and art. 14 of the 
ECHR.  
 А. Regarding art. 2 of the Convention 
 Regarding art.2 of the ECHR the complainant claimed that the regulations in the 
English legislation, requesting the destruction of the embryos after the withdrawal of Mr 
Johnston’s consent, violated the embryo’s right to life. Art.2 of the Convention reads: 
“Everyone’s right to life is protected by the law”. The question of whether the text of art.2 
comprises an unborn child has been raised in front of the ECtHR regarding the right to 
abortion, as disputed in lots of countries. The Strasbourg Court, in its 1980 judgment on the 
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case Paton vs. The United Kingdom
4
, stated that art.2 did not guarantee unlimited right to life 
of an unborn child (foetus), and therefore the abortion of a 10-week foetus did not contradict 
art.2 if it was made in conformity with medical results. Analyzing the second sentence of 
art.2: “No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of 
a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law”, it is 
obvious that the authors of the Convention hardly had in mind the life of a foetus, while the 
exceptions, as mentioned in the second sentence, refer to the already born. Under the case N. 
v. Norwey
5
 it was also confirmed that the interruption of a 14-week pregnancy did not violate 
art. 2 of the Convention, as it was pointed out that such a sphere was exclusively delicate and 
required both a delicate approach and trust in the national law of the respective country. In 
this sense, if the actions of the state authorities did not pass allowable limits, there was no 
reason to accept that there was a violation of  art.2. 
 Looking back to the Evans case, the Grand Chamber has pointed out that there has 
been no common consent among the European countries regarding the issue of the moment 
that human life begins. In conformity with English legislation the embryo does not have 
independent rights and interests, and could hardly claim the right to life under art.2 of the 
Convention
6
. 
 
 B. Regarding art. 8 of the Convention 
 
 Regarding art. 8 the Court accepted that “private life” is a term that refers to different 
aspects of the physical and social identity of the personality, including personality 
development as well as  establishing and developing relationships with other persons and the 
surrounding world, and refers to the right to respect the decision of a particular person to be or 
not to be a parent. The law court stressed that the complainant did not attack those regulations 
or practices of national law that hindered her in becoming a mother – in a social, juridical or 
even physical sense – as she could even adopt a child or give birth to one through in-vitro 
method with donor gametes. The complainant attacked that British legislation that did not 
allow her to use the created together with Mr Johnston embryos, and thus deprived her of the 
right to have a child, genetically connected with her. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR has 
accepted that the issue regarding the right to become a parent in the genetic sense refers to 
art.8 of the Convention
7
.  
 The dilemma in the essence of the Evans case is connected with the principle of justice 
and it refers to two persons’ rights as guaranteed by the Convention - satisfying one of them 
automatically leads to the rejection of other. If the embryos were allowed to be used by the 
complainant, it would mean that Mr Johnston would become a father against his will. But if 
the withdrawal of Mr Jonston’s consent were to be be legally accepted, the complainant 
would be deprived of the opportunity to become a genetic parent
8
.   
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 The Grand Chamber has pointed out that the case had been not only a conflict between 
two persons, but the attacked act by the English legislation served broader interests – the 
interests of the society in general. Because of that, what is stipulated is the principle that in 
such cases it is important for both parents to give their consent, which will make things more 
clear and definite legally
9
. The principle of shared responsibility is highly important in 
English legislation. In September 2002, Prof. John Harris of the university of Manchester 
stated that during fertility treatment both partners’ continuing consent was necessary at each 
level of the reproductive procedure. An eventual win of the case by Ms Evans would mean 
that the role of the man ends with inseminating the ovum
10
. 
 The in-vitro fertilization method is fundamentally connected with exclusively delicate 
moral and ethical problems regarding the rapid development of medicine and science. As the 
issues related to the case Evans refer to spheres which the member states of the European 
Council do not have a common approach for, the ECtHR considers that the freedom of 
judgment given by a country-defendant, Great Britain in particular, should be comparatively 
greater
11
, as the politics and the principles that shall be applied in these delicate and sensible 
fields should be defined by each country separately. 
 In the final analysis the Court, deeply sympathizing with the complainant, rejected the 
fact that her right to become a parent genetically should have great influence, and accepted 
that it should not be respected
12
. Taking into consideration such a claim would be to the 
detriment of not respecting Mr Jonston’s unwillingness to have a child genetically connected 
with Ms Evans. The Court reckons that when there is a lack of a common approach among the 
European countries, the regulations of the national law should set a justified balance among 
competing interests, and in that case there is no violation of art.8 of the Convention.  
  C. Regarding art. 14 of the Convention 
Art. 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms reads: „Exercising the rights and freedoms, stipulated in the 
Convention, should be provided without any discrimination, based on sex, race, skin 
complexion, religion, political and other convictions, national or social origin, belonging to a 
national minority, property, birth or some other indication.” 
Concerning art.14 of the Convention the complainant emphasized that this decree shall 
be interpreted with regard to art.7, pointing out that women, capable of conceiving without 
special treatment and help, did not undergo a control or influence on how the developed after 
the moment of fertilization, while a women using in vitro fertilization depended on the role of 
the sperm donor. The Court accepted that it was not necessary to pass judgement on the 
position of women using in vitro fertilization, as the reasons for the lack of violation of art.8 
of the Convention represented a good and impartial justification for the lack of violation of 
art.14 too.  
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Even before the verdict, British judge Wall presented an interesting example 
concerning the principle of justice and the presence or absence of discrimination from another 
point of view. For instance, in case a man is ill with testicular cancer which would lead to his 
sterility and his spermatozoa, preserved before the surgical intervention, are used to be made 
and preserved embryos along with his partner?. If the couple broke up before implanting the 
embryos in the female organism, it could scarcely be said that she could not revoke her 
decision about sterility treatment and give up implanting. The national law regulations, as 
well as the rights as guaranteed by the Convention, should be equally applied regarding men 
and women
13
. 
However, four judges had a particular opinion (which was?) as they did not agree with 
the conclusion that there were no violations related to the particular case of art.8 and art.14 
concerning art.8 of the Convention
14
. The reasons given referred basically to the following:  
First, both the Court and the parties agreed that art.8 could be applied to the particular 
case regarding the complainant’s right to respect her right to private and family life, in 
particular to respect her wish to become a parent genetically. The Court adopted that one of 
the main case issues was whether the regulations of the national legislation, enforced in this 
case, could achieve a balance between the public and private interests (par.76). The judges, 
having a particular opinion, considered that the intervention of the country has been stipulated 
by law and was aimed at keeping the public peace, ethics and other persons’ rights - they did 
not agree, however, that the intervention was necessary and proportionate to the specific 
case’s circumstances. Applying national legislation in that case is not proportionate, for no 
balance between both parties’ interests was possible regarding this particular case’s 
circumstances – the judgement, being in favour of Mr Johnston’s choice not to become a 
parent, suggested an absolute and final impossibility for Ms Evans to become a genetic 
parent.   
Moreover the four judges emphasized that Ms Evans acted conscientiously, relying on 
Mr Johnston’s initial assurances that he wished to be the father of her children. Furthermore, 
the request to destroy the embryos meant destroying the complainant’s ova. The legislation of 
the United Kingdom did not succeed in reaching a necessary and wise decision in this regard 
either. On the one hand the legislative act gives the right to the woman to have a child 
genetically connected with her, but on the other hand the same act actually deprives her 
forever of having such an opportunity, giving priority to the presence of both parents’ 
consent. Such an approach could hardly be compatible with the requirements of art.8 and the 
main purposes of the Convention, protecting human dignity. 
Concerning the reasons given by judge Wall in connection with the question of the 
presence or absence of discrimination, the four judges have emphasized that women are in a 
particular state giving birth to children(?), including the cases when the legislation tackles the 
issues of artificial insemination.  
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It shall be taken into consideration that the Court in Strasbourg could base its 
arguments on national legislation in any case, in spite of the fact that this could seem at first 
paradoxical, since the European Convention for human rights has been established with  
regard to national law. It is not always easy to base arguments on the regulations of national 
law, especially when it concerns some of the rights guaranteed by the Convention. For 
example, there is always a discrepancy between the right to abortion and the child’s right to 
life, and therefore lawyers in Europe find it difficult to solve a similar dilemma. In such cases, 
and when there is not a common approach among the states parties to the Convention, the 
ECtHR has relied on “the matter of some delicacy” 15 since the beginning of its activity, and 
has tended to acknowledge the discretionary right of each state to control the respective 
relations. 
The principle of proportionality means, as the Court in Strasbourg
16
 has had the 
opportunity to point out several times, that there should be a balance between the interests of 
society and the individual person’s rights when interpreting the Convention and enforcing its 
decrees with regard to a particular case. It is evident by the analysis of art.8-11 that this 
principle is an intrinsic part of the Convention, where there are restrictions imposed on the 
same right under certain circumstances together with the consolidation of the individual right 
to the person. However, each restriction of the right as guaranteed by the convention should 
be proportional to what it aims at. The Court applies the principle of proportionality not only 
in cases where there exists in the decree text an explicitly foreseen opportunity to restrict the 
individual right, but also when there are no specific instructions in the Convention, and the 
Court concludes on its own that the given right admits some restrictions. However, the 
principle of proportionality shall not change the essence of the right guaranteed. It is enforced 
with regard to art.14 of the Convention, as the Court emphasizes
17
 that in order to 
acknowledge the governmental intervention as a discriminatory one it is obviously necessary 
for the method of intervention not to correspond to the legal purpose due to which the 
respective intervention is necessary. 
As what was held up was came into force of Protocol 14 of the European Convention 
for the Human Rights and respectively joining the European Union to the ECHR, the member 
states of the EU took steps towards drawing their own catalogue of the main human rights and 
freedoms. The Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union was adopted by the 
European Council in Nice in December 2000, and amended and added to Strasbourg in 
December 2007. What has been adopted in the Charter of fundamental rights is the so called 
principle of the indivisibility of human rights – for the first time civil, political, economic and 
social rights are equally considered and established in a common way. Those right included in 
the charter are grouped by new criteria – on the basis of their subject regarding the integration 
process and their connection with the basic values of the Union (Benoit-Rohmer, 2009). There 
are rights from both groups in each part of the Charter – dignity, freedom, equality, esprit de 
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corps, citizenry and justice. In part І „Dignity” the right to life is stipulated.  As for the matter 
of abortion it is difficult to reach consent among the state members, the premature ending of 
the pregnancy as well as the right to life of the unborn child shall not be established in the 
Charter and the issue shall be resolved by the member states. Among the other rights in part I, 
what is of great interest is the so called bioethical rights – the prohibition of eugenic practices, 
the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial gain, as 
well as the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings /art.3 of the Charter/.  
Since now there has existed no case where the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
passed judgement that a given right as guaranteed by the Convention cannot be applied within 
Community law.  However, for each particular case, for each particular right it depends on the 
will of the Court in Luxembourg if it will be accepted that a given basic right is a part of the 
legal system of the European Union.   In order that a court ruling is to be enacted the ECJ 
pronounces its own judgment on the respective right or interprets one or another text of the 
ECHR, i.e not the ECtHR but the ECJ interprets the specific features of the respective right 
and its connection to the particular case. There is a risk in such a situation of establishing 
different practices when applying one and the same decree of the Convention, respectively 
regarding one and the same human rights on behalf of the ECtHR and the ECJ. As Prof. 
Florence Benoit-Rohmer states, there is a discrepancy in the practice of the both legal 
authorities regarding the inviolability of the home (Benoit-Rohmer, 2009). Whereas the 
ECtHR refers the inviolability not only to the private dwelling but also to the business one, 
the ECJ accepts that the inviolability of the home does not refer to business dwellings. Such 
differences are very rare and for the last years there regular meetings have been arranged of 
the judges from Strasbourg and Luxembourg in order to achieve one and the same 
interpretation of the law.  
In conclusion, looking back to the Evans case it could be pointed out that increasing 
the opportunities related to the IVF and crioconservation will inevitably lead to new legal and 
ethical issues. Recently science has emphasized that children that were born from frozen 
embryos were more rarely prematurely born or retarded than the in-vitro babies born from 
non-frozen embryos. It is thought that crioconservation could increase with 15% the number 
of the successful in-vitro attempts, as freezing the embryos allow a complete test of the 
embryos to be done as well as a choosing of the ones with a greater chance of procuring a 
healght pregnancy. As it is known, however, the frozen embryo is a result of the initiative of 
two persons – a man and a woman, which sets conditions of potential legal issue in the case 
that one of the parties wishes to decide the embryo’s fate without asking the other party.    
Unfortunately, European practice has not worked out unique criteria regarding these 
issues. In some countries withdrawing the consent up to the moment of implanting the embryo 
in the mother’s organism has been legislatively stipulated. In Hungary, for example, the 
woman has the right to continue the procedure in-vitro regardless of the husband’s death or a 
divorce. In Austria and Estonia a man’s consent could be withdrawn until the moment of 
fertilization. Then woman takes independent decision on the continuation of the procedure. In 
Germany and Switzerland it is allowed that no more than three embryos within a cycle of 
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treatment which according to the common rule shall be implanted together and immediately. 
In Italy freezing embryos is generally forbidden except in the explicitly mentioned 
hypotheses. In all cases making and preserving embryos is a problem that raises a number of 
legal and ethical issues that require a careful and balanced approach to resolve.  
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Summary  
 
This article examines a very controversial and unsettled area of international law. It discusses 
a case recently decided by the International Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The dilemma 
central to the case Evans v. The United Kingdom is connected with moral issues and it 
involves a conflict between the granted by the European Convention rights of two private 
individuals: the applicant and Mr. Johnston. Moreover, each person's interest is entirely 
irreconcilable with the other's, since if the applicant is permitted to use the embryos, Mr. 
Johnston will be forced to become a father, whereas if Johnston's refusal or withdrawal of 
consent is upheld, the applicant will be denied the opportunity of becoming a genetic parent. 
In the difficult circumstances of this case, whatever solution the national authorities might 
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adopt would result in the interests of one or the other parties to the IVF treatment being 
wholly frustrated. Since the use of IVF treatment and crioconservation gives rise to sensitive 
moral and ethical issues against a background of fast-moving medical and scientific 
developments, and since the questions raised by the case touch on areas where there is no 
clear common ground amongst the Member States, the European Court of Human Rights 
considers that the margin of appreciation to be afforded to the respondent State must be a 
wide one. 
Keywords: Human rights, paternity, in vitro fertilization (IVF treatment), principle of 
proportionality. 
